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Abstract—Outsourcing is typically considered to occur in three 
phases: decision, transition and operation. As outsourcing is 
now well established the switching of vendors and transitioning 
from one system to another is common. However, most of the 
research to date on outsourcing has focused on the decision and 
operation phases, leaving a gap between theory and practice 
concerning the transition phase. Transition in outsourcing 
entails the changing of systems, business processes and/or 
vendors. If a suitable transition approach is not applied 
pressures for another transition can immediately build. This 
paper presents results from a case study carried out on the 
‘Novopay Project’ in which the Ministry of Education in New 
Zealand changed their vendor from an onshore to a near-shore 
provider. This project resulted in a sequence of three transitions, 
with each following a different approach as a direct result of the 
experiences encountered in the previous transition. In this 
research we made use of the rich ‘data dump’ of evidence 
provided by the Ministry of Education (MoE). Our analysis 
describes how a client organization can become trapped in a 
continuous transition cycle if a suitable approach is not applied. 
Transition1 involved the client – MoE – moving from complete 
outsourcing to selective insourcing. After realizing that they did 
not have the capabilities to manage insourcing, Transition2 was 
initiated. In Transition2 the sourcing approach reverted back to 
complete outsourcing. When it was realized that the new vendor 
in Transition2 could not in fact deliver a new service model or 
support end-users in following new business processes, 
Transition3 was initiated. In Transition3, the client established 
an internal company to insource service operations to support 
end-users. Transition can be a sound business strategy initiated 
for a range of reasons. However, if a flawed sourcing approach 
is chosen it can result in ‘continuous transition’.   
Keywords—transition; switching of vendors; continuous 
transition; Novopay Project; outsourcing 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
With the increased use of outsourcing in recent decades there 
has also been a higher incidence of failures, delays, relationship 
breakdowns and unsatisfactory performance [1]. The bulk of the 
outsourcing literature considers it to be a dyadic relationship 
between client and vendor [2][3], instead of taking into 
consideration that organizations are now moving towards more 
selective approaches of combining best-of-breed IT services 
from multiple vendors [4] [5]. Increasingly, client companies are 
thus declining to renew or even continue their outsourcing 
contracts, and therefore switching of vendors (also known as 
‘transition’) is becoming more common [6]. Butler et al. [7] 
divided the sourcing process into three main phases: Decision, 
Transition and Operation. Transition follows after contract 
negotiation and signing and precedes service delivery and 
operation [1]. In conducting their analysis Butler et al. [7] 
categorized 116 articles based upon the focus of attention of 
GSE projects and found that just 2 of those articles were related 
to the transition phase. This finding coincides with the results of 
a systematic snapshot mapping study which categorized 301 
articles across various dimensions and found that only 19 were 
related to transition [8]. This suggests that researchers have 
focused more on establishing the drivers behind outsourcing 
while less attention has been given to issues relating to the 
switching of vendors and/or transition of software systems. 
Transition is thus a comparatively emergent and under-
researched phenomenon of outsourcing, where clients replace 
their incumbent vendor [9]. It can be assumed that, when clients 
begin outsourcing for the first time, client-specific knowledge 
and human resources are transferred from the client organization 
to the vendor organizations [10]. However, during transition an 
outgoing vendor has limited interest in supporting an incoming 
vendor [10]. So what happens when an outsourcing contract 
expires or when a client organization decides to terminate their 
current contract with a vendor? [7] The three main options at this 
stage are either to renegotiate the contract and continue with the 
same vendor, switch the vendor and continue with outsourcing, 
or backsource the previously outsourced activities and insource 
them to an internal entity [11]. In this paper we report the 
findings of a Novopay case study in which the client became 
trapped in a cycle of ‘continuous transition’ wherein they were 
frequently moving from one sourcing strategy to another. In 
particular we identify and discuss the main reasons for this 
continuous transition so as to create better awareness and 
understanding of how such a situation arises and to possibly help 
others avoid such circumstances.   
The data used in this research was made available under New 
Zealand’s freedom of information laws, chronicled the history 
and evolution of the Novopay project over several years from its 
initiation to conclusion. As elaborated in section IV below, the 
data ranged from cabinet minutes, through project plans, 
steering committee minutes, correspondence and independent 
review reports. Although this type of data is not often used in SE 
related case studies, there are instances in which researchers 
have employed such data and provided effective results. Verner 
& Abdullah [12] suggests that secondary data can be valuable 
for carrying out case studies if there is enough information in the 
data to answer research questions. However, there is no control 
by the researcher over the collection of data, and a researcher is 
constrained by the nature of available data [13]. It can also take 
a long time to become familiar with such data. To carry out this 
research, a set of summary Narratives were derived through a 
key point extraction and coding process, complemented by 
Antecedent-Consequence diagrams. Narrative analysis provides 
thick and rich descriptions about the phenomenon, which is 
considered within a sequence of actions that occurred over time. 
Through this set of narratives we illustrate the difficulties 
encountered, showing how a client may become trapped in a 
vicious cycle of outsourcing and insourcing. Analysis of rich and 
complex sequences of events emerging over time in such large 
and complex undertakings – in this case over a 10-year period – 
warrant a narrative approach, given its capacity to adequately 
synthesize and capture the unfolding ‘saga’ of a process. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
describes the Novopay case, whereas Section III and Section IV 
describe the method, the type of data used in this research and 
the approach to data analysis and, respectively. Results are 
presented in Section V, with subsequent discussion in Section 
VI and limitations in section VII. Section VIII concludes the 
paper.  
II. CASE DESCRIPTION 
Novopay is the current payroll system of the Ministry of 
Education, New Zealand. As such it is responsible for paying all 
teaching and non-teaching staff of the country’s public sector 
schools. It serves around 2500 schools with 120,000 employees, 
to whom NZ$4.2 billion are disbursed annually. Not only is the 
payroll system large and complex, it also has some unique 
sector-specific aspects (e.g., staff may be employed at more than 
one school at the same time but receive a single payslip; many 
staff are rehired anew each year).  The initial business case for 
Novopay was approved in 2005. Prior to that the Ministry’s 
payroll system was managed, owned and operated by a New 
Zealand based vendor, Datacom (the outgoing vendor). After the 
approval of the new business case a full scale tender process was 
initiated after which Talent2 (the incoming vendor), an 
Australian based supplier, was chosen to implement the new 
payroll system. 
During the transition, Novopay went through several 
variations and delays. An initial setback occurred when the 
implementation approach was changed after 2 years, which 
necessitated a second round of tendering.  Implementation 
delays in 2010 led to concerns about the feasibility of the project 
and the incoming vendor’s ability to deliver. As a consequence 
of this, the project was re-baselined and strengthened at several 
levels {Education Report: Update on Schools' Payroll Project, 
Jan 2012}. A new timetable was thus included in the official 
variation I agreement: {Project Initiation Contract Part4 
Variation Agreement, Oct 2010} with the go-live date set for 
June 2011.  However, there were concerns raised by external 
quality assurance bodies Independent Quality Assurance New 
Zealand (IQANZ) (www.iqanz.com) and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (PWC) about the timely completion of the project.  
The above resulted in a second variation of contract and, 
subsequently, another timetable was established, with a go-live 
date of July 2012 {Second Variation Agreement, 2011}. The 
Novopay system eventually went live in August 2012 with 
known defects and work-arounds.  Subsequently, it faced severe 
technical issues and major challenges in terms of end-users’ 
acceptance, with significant periods of non-payment or 
erroneous payment of staff, service shortfalls and general 
confusion, uproar from the education sector and embarrassment 
for the Ministry, such that a cabinet minister was appointed to 
oversee the project. After 2 years of unsatisfactory service in a 
live production setting, and robust negotiations over non-
performance with the vendor, the service operations were back 
sourced in house by the Ministry of Education (client-MoE) 
{Education Payroll Limited – Statement of Intent 2015}. The 
scope of a transition can vary depending upon the context of its 
project. In the Novopay case, the project involved the changing 
of a payroll system and vendor for the public education sector. 
The scope of transition in the Novopay project, and so also for 
this research, is outlined as follows: Set up a service desk and 
payroll centres, Implement a payroll system (or systems), 
Receive a data extract from the existing payroll system; 
transform, clean and load the data into the new payroll 
system(s), Define and implement new service support and 
service delivery processes, including IT systems, Deliver new 
business processes, and train Ministry staff and schools payroll 
support staff {Project Novopay Review Report, Report by 
Extrinsic, Jan 2010}.  
III. RESEARCH METHOD AND APPROACH 
In general the need for case study research arises out of a 
desire to understand a complex phenomenon and to focus on a 
specific instance or ‘case’ while retaining an holistic and real-
world perspective [14]. Case studies have been increasingly 
adopted in software engineering in general and in Global 
Software Engineering in particular – prior research [8] has found 
that the most dominant methods used in GSE-related research 
are field and case studies and interviews. Choosing a particular 
research method implies making a trade-off between level of 
control and degree of realism. A case study is ideal for 
conducting research in a real world setting, permitting a high 
level of realism, but mostly at the expense of control [15]. Based 
on the particular research approach, case studies can be 
classified into four different types:  descriptive, exploratory, 
explanatory or evaluatory [16]. For this research, an exploratory 
and evaluatory type of case study was considered most suited. 
The aim of this research was not to test any theory or evaluate 
any tool, but rather to seek insights and new ideas about the 
phenomenon of transition and to evaluate the feasibility of using 
a rich mine of available data by applying a plurality of paradigms 
and data analysis methods. 
Reliance on a single case study has often been critiqued for 
its limited generalizability [17]. However, Yin [14] notes its 
appropriateness according to five rationales, specifically, when 
the case is: critical, unusual, common, revelatory, or 
longitudinal. Two of these circumstances arise in this research, 
revelatory and longitudinal, meaning that the use of a single case 
is acceptable. Although switching/transitioning of vendors or 
software systems is not uncommon in private and public sector 
organizations, this phenomenon is usually not accessible to 
researchers. This defines the case under consideration as 
revelatory. The case under consideration, being based on both 
an initial and an evolving set of data and events, also raised the 
opportunity to analytically segment and analyze the underlying 
phenomenon at multiple points in time, thus making it 
effectively longitudinal.  
IV. DATA ANALYSIS USING NARRATIVES 
A narrative approach to analysis challenges the commonly 
prevalent notion that success and failure in systems development 
are brought about by simple causation [18]. In their simple form 
narratives provide a way to create shareable understanding of a 
socio-technical phenomenon [19] in which events and 
consequences are joined [18]. Davidson [20] demonstrates that 
narratives can be used to provide deep insights, and Fincham 
[18] suggests that application of such an approach can be seen 
as thematic interpretations placed upon a train of events. In other 
words, narratives present an interpretation of events which 
constitute core organizational knowledge [21], and these events 
are made understandable by integrating them within a sequence 
[18]. Narratives were complemented in this research by 
antecedent and consequence diagrams as these can help to 
describe and explain events connected in summary form [22]. 
They should not be seen as an attempt to create cause-effect type 
relationships, however. Antecedents are not claimed to be the 
necessary or sufficient precursors to produce certain 
consequences. 
The Novopay data used for this research was (and is) 
available in the public domain. This rich mine of data was 
published by the Ministry of Education, New Zealand on their 
website, to satisfy official information act stipulations, as well 
as to head off multiple piecemeal enquiries by the press over the 
project’s many issues. It can be accessed through this web link: 
http://www.education.govt.nz/ministry-of-
education/information-releases/novopay-information-release. 
These types of public ‘data dumps’ provide an untapped avenue 
for researchers to consider. Given the potential importance of 
these data dumps, and noting that there had been limited research 
focus on the transition phase of outsourcing, when data 
associated with the Novopay project were released to the public 
in 2013 we took the opportunity to do a pilot study [23]. After 
confirming the relevance of the Novopay data from that pilot 
study, noting the spectacular failure of this transition project, a 
full-scale data analysis was initiated. Data dumps like this 
provide an alternate source of data for research. Some 
researchers even prefer this type of data over surveys or 
interviews [13]. This data comprised periodic reports from 
external consulting companies PwC, Deloitte, Equinox, Maven, 
IQANZ and Extrinsic covering various time periods. These data 
files are classified in Table I [24]. These covered different 
phases of the Novopay project from the inception of idea to 
justification of the project. These included the decision phase, 
an interim period when transition was going on and the initial 
operation period after the new vendor took over. Most of these 
documents were dated between 2008 and 2012-13, but the data 
corpus also included reports from 1996, 2004-05, 2007 and 
2014-15. This provided an opportunity to chronologically 
arrange data and analyze it longitudinally.  
TABLE I.  DATA SOURCES [24] 
Internal Reports and Meeting 
Minutes 
Communication 
Memos of Ministry of Education 
(MoE) 
Correspondence between 
representatives of MoE and Exec. 
of the main vendor 
Cabinet Meeting Minutes Emails of end-users 
Status Reports Project Related Documents 
Steering Committee Meeting 
Minutes 
Risk Registers 
Payroll Reference Group Meeting 
Minutes  
Project Initiation Doc. 
Novopay Board Meeting Minutes Request For Proposal Doc.- 
including revised versions 
Quarterly Meeting Reports for High 
Risk Projects  
Business Case Doc. 
Periodic Reports of External 
Companies 
 
Fallback plans and proposals 
 
PwC 
Test Plans and strategies 
Deloitte Communication plans 
Equinox Reports about variations in the 
agreement 
Maven Progress review reports 
IQANZ End-users Surveys 
Extrinsic Remedial plans and programs  
Data analysis primarily followed thematic synthesis steps 
mentioned in [25]. Thematic synthesis draws on the principles 
of thematic analysis to infer recurring themes or issues from 
multiple primary studies. Thematic synthesis steps helped in 
identifying recurrent themes and build concepts and higher order 
themes over them. As the Novopay data files had varying levels 
of data abstraction, the thematic synthesis steps, although time 
intensive, helped in the movement of understanding constantly 
from the whole list of recurring themes to its new constituent 
parts and themes. As the data files were analyzed one by one, 
understanding of the transition process, both as a whole and its 
constituent parts, improved. The Novopay data dump comprised 
375 PDF files. The data analysis process began with the 
extraction of key-points from these data-files [24]. The criteria 
were based on first analyzing and then extracting ‘sections of 
text’ if they addressed one or more of the following: stakeholder 
actions and/or their consequences, stakeholder decisions, risks, 
issues and concerns. This analysis was conducted by the first 
author, periodically reviewing and cross checking sets of 
findings with the other authors.  
 As most of the data files were directly scanned from 
physical copies, therefore, the nature of these files were ‘image-
based’. The downside of working with image-based files is its 
inability to directly ‘select’ and ‘code’ data in NVivo. An initial 
challenge was to ‘code’ data in image-based data files. Multiple 
OCR tools were used to extract text from image based files. 
These tools had limitations on the number of pages and to 
overcome this issue, original PDF data files were split using 
‘Split-PDF’ tool and then OCR tools were used on each sub file 
to extract relevant text. A key-point is a snippet of relevant text, 
its composition varied from a few lines to paragraphs. It included 
relevant information either about stakeholders, transition scope 
or stakeholder actions, which were then used to carry out further 
analysis. The key-points thus extracted from the data files 
comprised 724 A4 pages of text, and were afterwards stored in 
NVivo10 for coding. Coding then resulted in 245 parent and 
child nodes in NVivo. This process initially followed an 
inductive reasoning approach, however, after creating a list of 
codes, it was supplemented by a deductive reasoning process. 
The approach taken in this phase was mostly exhaustive rather 
than selective. This can be indicated from the total 86 parent 
Nodes of NVivo in which only 12 had one ‘reference’. Whereas, 
the top ten number of references were 95, 77, 65, 62, 55, 48, 48, 
46, 43, 42 as indicated in Table II. It indicates the level of 
saturation achieved in data analysis. After the key-points 
extraction step, a second level of analysis – step 2 was carried 
out in which all the key-points were coded in NVivo. In this 
research, the term ‘Coding’ is used for this level of analysis. 
During the coding step, selective and relevant sections of the 
key-points were identified and labeled across the entire extracted 
text in key-points.  
TABLE II.  SAMPLE OF TOP TEN CODES 
Parent Codes Frequency Parent Codes Frequency 
Service 95 Other risks and issues 48 
Training 77 Material Breach 48 
Data Issues 65 Resource Constraints 46 
Enduser Issues 62 Introduction Novopay 43 
Defects Status 55 Transition2 Approach 42 
This Coding process was followed by step 3, ‘establishing 
and categorizing themes’. In this step all the codes were 
categorized into ‘themes’, different codes and associated key-
points were merged and combined together. Categorized themes 
were then used in step 4 to explore relationships and connections 
between themes. During the process of data analysis care was 
taken to ensure that interpretations were linked to their source 
by creating a clear chain of evidence and maintaining a link 
between them. In order to establish trustworthiness and 
reliability of synthesis in step 5, a researcher lens and external 
people lens were applied, with the first author as the researcher 
and the subsequent authors providing the external perspective. 
These approaches were established and carried out in parallel 
with all stages of data analysis and synthesis. Afterwards, higher 
order themes were established. All of the codes and their 
associated key-points were arranged in a spread-sheet. They 
were reviewed, re-ordered and combined, resulting in 74 higher 
order themes (and this paper presents results from a subset of 
these themes relating particularly to transition). These themes 
were arranged chronologically in a spread-sheet to support 
synthesis and the establishment of suitable sequences of themes 
to enable the development of narratives.  These narratives, 
capturing the initiation and approach for each transition 
described in Section V, are complemented by graphical 
representations that also describe the sequence of events. 
V. RESULTS  
A. Transition 1: Initiation   
This narrative describes the justifications and reasons behind 
the initiation of Transition1 in the Novopay project. These items 
are classified into three main categories: client related, vendor 
related and system related reasons as highlighted in the 
antecedent-consequence diagram, Fig.1. The argument is 
supported by the selective use of representative quotes. 
The client-MoE had been working with an incumbent 
onshore vendor through a BPO contract for over a decade. The 
incumbent system was owned, operated, and maintained by this 
incumbent Vendor-Datacom, therefore, the client-MoE had 
limited leverage to negotiate favorable terms and conditions. 
This heavy reliance contributed towards a ‘vendor lock in’ 
situation, as the client-MoE had lost expertise to control payroll 
business processes for the education sector. “The Ministry’s 
management of the outsourced payroll service provider led to 
substantial loss of Ministry visibility and knowledge of payroll 
processes, systems, and performance” {Novopay Tender 
Documents, Revised Stage2 Business Case, Nov 2007}. “Lack 
of Ministry knowledge placed the incumbent vendor in a 
monopolist role, with the Ministry uncertain about whether it 
was getting value for money and whether it had an accurate view 
of service performance and risk” {Revised: Stage2 Business 
Case Payroll Strategy for Schools, Nov 2007}. In addition, over 
the course of time, changes in policies had also identified the 
need for end-users to be given direct access to their HR 
information. It was apparent, however, that the incumbent 
system could not support this new functionality. “The lack of 
access for schools to the payroll system is hindering their ability 
to effectively manage their employees. Direct access to 
information would also lower the transaction cost involved with 
these inquiries, both for the central payroll operation and the 
schools making the inquiries” {Stage 2 Business Case, May 
2005}.  
More generally, the incumbent system was ageing and so 
only limited features were available in comparison to those 
offered by modern payroll systems. For example, on-line access; 
leave management; and linking of salaries to pay grades were 
highly desired features not available in the incumbent system. It 
was also anticipated that where new legislation sanctioned 
changes to processes the incumbent system may not be able to 
sustain those changes. It would then have to rely on manual and 
error-prone workarounds. “Extending the time required to run 
the existing systems raises the risk of some kind of public failure. 
This may be through a failure of the payroll itself so that 
significant number of staff are paid incorrectly or an inability to 
implement government policy (e.g. tax changes, 
superannuation)” {Internal Memo Recommendations for Next 
Steps, May 2007}. The above contributors urged the client-MoE 
to move towards Transition1. As legacy systems age their 
support tends to become more cumbersome. Therefore, vendors 
develop new versions and transfer their clients. This provides an 
easier approach for vendors to maintain their systems and also 
to develop avenues for revenue generation. Any client choosing 
to continue with the old version may have to bear its full 
maintenance costs. “Extending the time of operation on the 
existing TM4/DATAPAY [Incumbent System] system means that 
the ministry will be the sole user of TM4/DATAPAY [Incumbent 
System] for an extended period of time.  Datacom is currently 
migrating its clients to JETPAY [new system] and expects to 
have completed this before June 2011. The ministry will 
therefore bear all costs and risks of a functionally and 
technically obsolete system” {Internal Memo: 
Recommendations for Next Steps, May 2007}. “The projected 
‘status quo’ has also made provision for the increased share of 
the DATAPAY application overhead to be borne by the Ministry 
as Datacom’s other payroll service customers are migrated off 
the application leading up to 2011/2012” {Revised Stage2 
Business Case, Nov 2007}. In the Novopay case, the client-MoE 
could not migrate to a new version because of probity 
requirements. In the public sector, clients are required to follow 
an open tender process to choose a new system.  
In certain cases, third party vendors cut off support for 
underlying technologies making it infeasible for the main-
vendor to keep the incumbent system operational. In Novopay, 
there was uncertainty about server’s operating system and 
database and whether the third party vendors (Microsoft and 
Oracle) would provide assistance in case of issues. “The two 
major sustainability issues identified in this report [Technical 
review carried out by a third party] are the unsupported 
versions of the TeacherManager [Incumbent system] Server 
operating system and database currently used. The Microsoft 
Windows NT 3.51 operating system used has been unsupported 
by Microsoft since September 2002, and version 7.2.x of the 
Oracle Database has been unsupported since October 2000” 
{Datacom Payroll Application Sustainability Review, Carried 
out by Equinox, Aug 2004}. These scenarios encouraged the 
vendor to push for Transition1. 
Automation of business rules helps in consistent 
implementation of policies, by conceding limited chances for 
manual interpretations. In Novopay, the incumbent system had 
limited in-built automated rules which resulted in inconsistent 
application of policies thus contributing towards Transition1. 
“[E]employment agreements are being interpreted manually in 
different pay centers, resulting in increased risk of business rule 
inconsistencies and incorrect application of entitlements” 
{Cabinet Meeting Minutes, CABMin_05_20_2, June 2005}. 
Figure 1 below encapsulates these drivers for Transition 1 in an 
antecedent-consequence diagram.  
 
Figure 1.  Antecedents which impacted transition initiation 
B. Transition 1: Approach 
Realizing the need for transition had established that 
continuing the current arrangements carried insurmountable 
risks.  Therefore, it was decided that a new COTS based system 
be acquired and, afterward, the client-MoE integrate its 
components internally. Hence, a selective insourcing approach 
was chosen for Transition1. “This would have involved the 
ministry purchasing a new payroll system and operating as a 
'systems integrator’ for all the various components of the 
solution” {Cabinet Meeting Minutes, CABMin_08_29_2, July 
2008}. “The ministry was to manage the hosting of the 
infrastructure, with the pay-clerk services continuing to be 
provided by the existing supplier until these services could be 
re-tendered” {Cabinet Meeting Minutes, CABMin_07_30_3B, 
Aug 2007}. Subsequently, a request for information (RFI) and 
request for proposal (RFP) were issued. Some of the key 
elements of this approach, taken from {Cabinet Meeting 
Minutes, CABMin_07_30_3B, Aug 2007}, are listed in Table 
I. 
Selective insourcing required the client–MoE to build 
internal capabilities. In order to carry this out a special internal 
unit was set up to help deliver this project. “The enhancement 
of the business processes includes the establishment of a 
Central Advisory Unit (CAU) within the ministry. This would 
establish a payroll operations and management capability 
enabling the ministry to manage the complex integration 
required” {Revised Stage2 Business Case, Nov 2007}. Using 
this approach of selective insourcing the two main issues 
prevalent in the previous service model – loss of Intellectual 
Property and technical/functional obsolescence – were 
addressed. “This approach would address the two key issues of 
loss of ministry IP and the growing technical and functional 
obsolescence of the DATAPAY/TM4 system” {Revised Stage2 
Business Case, Nov 2007}. 
TABLE I. TRANSITION 1 APPROACH 
Selective Insourcing Approach in Transition 1 
The new system will be licensed by the client-MoE 
The client-MoE will purchase the hardware to operate the system 
The new system and hardware shall be supported and hosted by third 
parties 
Outgoing-Vendor Datacom shall continue to provide operational support 
services through the new system 
The client-MoE will increase the number of internal resources to manage 
the operations effectively 
C. Transition 2: Initiation  
The approach taken in Transition1 was subsequently 
changed during implementation. A revised approach Transition2 
was thus considered, only after two years. In this narrative, a 
brief description is provided about the circumstances which led 
to this change. One of the central premises for initiating 
Transition1 was the technical unsustainability of the incumbent 
system, however, later reviews invalidated this premise. PWC 
reviewed the earlier business case and concluded that the central 
premise of ‘urgent change’ was no longer valid. “[W]e conclude 
that the assumptions, upon which the Business Case is based, 
are no longer valid. Specifically, we consider that the conclusion 
in the Business Case, that the option of upgrading the existing 
system presents unacceptably high technology risks, is no longer 
correct” {Revised Stage2 Business Case, Nov 2007}.  
This advancement overruled urgent replacement of the 
incumbent system and provided an opportunity for the client-
MoE to reconsider its Transition1 approach. During this time, 
technology upgrades and new developments, in a combination 
of platform upgrades and extension of support by the third party 
IT vendors, extended the potential use of the existing incumbent 
system. "One of the key premises for urgent systems change was 
therefore no longer considered valid” {Cabinet Meeting 
Minutes CABMin_07_30_3B, Aug 2007}. In short, the life span 
for the incumbent system was extended. 
Another contributing factor towards changing from the 
Transition1 approach was the acknowledgement by client-MoE 
that their capabilities lay in creating policies rather than 
managing operations of a large scale IT system. “The operation 
of systems and processes required by a large payroll is not the 
core expertise of the ministry” {Revised Stage2 Business Case, 
Nov 2007}. Therefore, the client-MoE subsequently reassessed 
the Transition1 approach and advised the Cabinet that a 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) approach would 
potentially be more cost-effective and manageable at a lower 
risk. “As a result, in Aug 2007 Cabinet rescinded the May 2005 
decision for the Ministry to own and operate the schools’ payroll 
system and agreed that the ministry could start the acquisition 
of a BPO services vendor” {Novopay Tender Documents – 
Collated}. Ironically, the Novopay project, which began on a 
pretext that outsourcing reduces a client’s control of their core 
competencies, was to be outsourced again in Transition2.  
D. Transition 2: Approach 
Due to probity requirements of the New Zealand public 
sector, Transition2 required a complete re-tender of the project 
i.e., returning to the market and choosing a suitable vendor. One 
of the concerns about re-tendering was the negative impact it 
may have on the client-MoE’s reputation. “A return to the 
market will negatively impact the Ministry’s reputation as it will 
be perceived that almost three years have been spent with no 
decision” {Internal Memo: Recommendations for Next Steps, 
May 2007}. “The market is aware that the ministry has not been 
able to come to decision for two years and so will be potentially 
sc[k]eptical regarding their own chances of finalising a 
contract” {Internal Memo: Recommendations for Next Steps, 
May 2007}. Re-tendering the same project may discourage 
known and capable vendors from further bidding. “Both vendors 
have invested significant resources over three years to win the 
Ministry’s business with little perceived progress. Requiring 
them to continue to invest may result in increased proposed costs 
to cover the costs incurred to win the Ministry’s business. There 
is also a possibility that Talent2 may withdraw from the 
process” {Internal Memo: Recommendations for Next Steps, 
May 2007}.  
An alternative to re-tendering can be to award the new BPO 
contract to a known vendor, in Novopay it could have been the 
vendor chosen in Transition1. However this presented a 
reputational risk with legal repercussions. “This presents 
significant reputation risk to the ministry: there is a possibility 
of third party challenge which would delay implementation, 
negating the elapsed time advantages, and as this option 
breaches the Cabinet mandatory procurement guidelines, 
Cabinet would need to approve this option. This is potential 
reputation risk to Cabinet” {Internal Memo: Recommendations 
for Next Steps, May 2007}.  
Another alternative is to carry out a closed tender process 
between the known vendors. In Novopay, these could have been 
the vendors chosen for Transition1 i.e., Talent2 and the 
incumbent vendor-Datacom. However, there were significant 
probity issues and concerns in following a closed tender process. 
Therefore, this option was not pursued. “If a closed tender were 
conducted between Talent2 and Datacom, the ministry would 
need to demonstrate reasonable evidence that these were the two 
most appropriate vendors, and that there were no other vendors 
able to reasonably deliver the same services to the level required 
under comparable commercial conditions. Because of the size of 
the potential contract, the elapsed time since the 2004 tender, 
and the lack of opportunity for other vendors to bid, there is a 
possibility of third party challenge and potential delay to 
implementation” {Internal Memo: Recommendations for Next 
Steps, May 2007}.  
After considering the various alternatives an open tender 
process was convened for Transition2; however, it was 
acknowledged that the most appropriate vendors would either be 
Talent2 or Datacom. “Either choosing Talent2 or Datacom has 
the lowest commercial risk. Costs and conditions have been 
agreed to a large extent and the competition between Datacom 
and Talent2 has enabled favourable commercial terms to be 
gained for the ministry” {Internal Memo: Recommendations for 
Next Steps, May 2007}. Drivers for retendering the same project 
are shown in Figure 2. 
As expected, in the retendering process the two main 
vendors, being the incumbent vendor Datacom and the new 
vendor Talent2 (chosen for Transition1), became direct 
competitors. “Both Talent2 and Datacom were fully aware that 
they were now in competition with each other” {Novopay Project 
History, March 2007}. Talent2 had been the favored choice of the 
Steering Committee Group in the initial assessment, but 
Datacom strengthened its position to become a genuine 
contender. “With the passage of time the relative position of 
Datacom has been strengthening and it is not clear that Talent2 
would continue as the recommended option in the next draft of 
the Revised Business Case” {Novopay Project History, March 
2008}. 
 
Figure 2. Antecedents which impact on changing sourcing strategies 
An unplanned initiation of Transition2 pushed out the project 
timelines, which, in effect, required the client-MoE to extend 
their Business as Usual (BAU) contract with the incumbent 
vendor Datacom. In order to negotiate a favorable deal, BAU 
extensions were worked out before finalizing the vendor for 
Transition2. As Datacom were bidding for Transition2, it was 
anticipated, they may extend BAU on conditions favorable to 
client-MoE. However, “If Datacom is not chosen as the vendor 
for the new schools’ payroll, it will no longer have this incentive. 
It is therefore important that the contract extension be signed as 
soon as possible, certainly before the RFP responses from 
vendors are received and the evaluation starts” {Revised 
Stage2 Business Case, Nov 2007}. 
Evaluation of the Transition2 proposals found Talent2 fit-
for-purpose. Talent2 was therefore selected as the preferred 
vendor. “Talent2‘s proposal had the highest overall weighted 
evaluation score, could deliver a solution at acceptable risk, and 
was within the schools’ payroll funding envelope” {Cabinet 
Meeting Minutes, CABMin_08_29_2, July 2008}. The 
following Table II lists the key elements of Transition2. 
TABLE II. TRANSITION 2 APPROACH 
Reverting back to complete outsourcing approach in Transition 2  
In 2007, Transition1, approach to own and operate the payroll system was 
cancelled. Acquisition for a BPO vendor was initiated for Transition2 
{Novopay Tender Documents – Collated} 
In Transition2, a single prime vendor will be accountable for a total payroll 
service {Cabinet Meeting Minutes, CABMin_07_30_3B, Aug 2007}      
Transition2 will required fewer client resources, still enabling them to retain 
the expertise required for effective management {Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 
CABMin_07_30_3B, Aug 2007}  
Contracts in Transition2 will be carefully constructed to provide strong 
incentives for the vendor to provide the required quality of services. 
{Cabinet Meeting Minutes, CABMin_07_30_3B, Aug 2007} 
E. Transition 3: Initiation and Approach 
After the completion of Transition2, the Novopay project 
went live and the operational phase of outsourcing began. 
During this time significant issues were faced by end-users. The 
extent of these issues were such that a cabinet minister was 
appointed as the ‘Minister responsible for Novopay’. It was 
followed up by a technical review and a Ministerial inquiry [15]. 
These circumstances compelled the client-MoE to reconsider 
whether to continue with the same arrangements or carry out 
another transition, i.e., Transition3. One plausible alternative 
was to revert back to the old vendor, which might have generated 
different reactions from various segments of end-users. On the 
one hand, it could increase the goodwill of end-users struggling 
with the new system. However it might also have brought 
disruption for satisfied end-users, as the latter group may not 
consider another change worthwhile. “Insufficient change 
management could result in a rapid loss of any goodwill and 
potentially significant operational problems” {Key risk areas, 
Datacom school’s payroll proposal, by Deloitte, April 2013}.  
Reverting back to the old vendor would also require 
challenging and uncertain data cleansing efforts. This was 
dependent upon coordinated reconciliation activities to resolve 
any data related issues. “Reconciliation will be difficult and will 
take a long time” {Outlining Proposal for Resuming Payroll 
Services, by Datacom, March 2013}. Some data may be 
impossible to reconcile” {Outlining Proposal for Resuming 
Payroll Services, by Datacom, March 2013}. After the 
completion of a transition the operations are taken over by a new 
vendor and the old vendor may not have access to or visibility 
of the data stored in the new system. At this stage, if a client 
decides to revert back to the old vendor (i.e., Transition3) then 
it would require another cycle of transition and support from the 
new vendor.  “All of these will require support from Talent2. 
The approach to data conversion will require significant effort 
from schools” {Key risk areas, Datacom school’s payroll 
proposal, by Deloitte, April 2013}. “Inadequate management of 
data activities could increase project costs and result in 
significant payroll issues” {Key risk areas, Datacom school’s 
payroll proposal, by Deloitte, April 2013}.  
In the Novopay case, it was concluded that another transition 
would bring significant disruption to the sector again. “This 
would complicate the management and governance demands on 
the Ministry. The underlying commercial and contractual 
arrangements would be complex” {Key risk areas, Datacom 
school’s payroll proposal, by Deloitte, April 2013}. “In 
addition, there would be challenges in keeping the Novopay 
service operating during the transition. It is likely that Novopay 
would lose key people and there would be continuing contention 
between Novopay, Datacom, and the Ministry over the relatively 
small pool of people with deep schools payroll expertise” 
{Education Report: Recommendations on Datacom 
contingency, April 2013}. Thus, it was decided to continue with 
the new vendor, “the Ministry is recommending that the current 
proposed contingency option not be taken up” {Education 
Report: Recommendations on Datacom contingency, April 
2013}.  
However, after approximately two years, when end-users 
continued to face issues and continued to complain about the 
level of service, the client-MoE decided to set up an internal 
crown entity Education Payroll Limited (EPL) to take over 
operational responsibilities from the vendor Talent2. Thus 
Transition3 was initiated. Operations related to processing of 
payroll were then backsourced to EPL. “EPL is a Crown 
company established to provide payroll services to New 
Zealand’s schools. We were incorporated in August 2014 to take 
over the operation of the schools payroll service from Talent2 in 
October 2014. Ownership is held equally between two 
Shareholding Ministers, the Minister Responsible for Novopay 
and the Minister of Finance. EPL is governed by a Crown 
appointed Board of Directors” {Education Payroll Limited, 
Statement of Intent, 2015}. Setting up an internal entity required 
another transition to ensure that the new set up has the 
capabilities to operate and the services are successfully 
transferred. Table III lists the key elements of Transition3. 
The following Figure 3 highlights this phenomenon of volatility 
in sourcing strategies and continuous transition. 
 
 
Figure 3. Antecedents which impact on changing sourcing strategies 
TABLE III. TRANSITION 3 APPROACH 
Moving payroll service to a Government owned company in 
Transition 3 
Internal company EPL was incorporated in August 2014 for Transition3 to 
take over operational services from the vendor chosen in Transition2 
{Education Payroll Limited – Statement of Intent 2015} 
Ownership of this internal company was held between two Shareholding 
Ministers, the Minister Responsible for Novopay and the Minister of 
Finance. It was governed by a Crown appointed Board of Directors 
{Education Payroll Limited – Statement of Intent 2015} 
Transition3 changed the previous approach by shifting from decentralized 
service delivery model to a centralized service delivery model.  
EPL was responsible for payroll processing, customer service functions and 
all operational relationships. {Education Payroll Limited – Statement of 
Intent 2015} 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Continuous and excessive reliance upon the same vendor in 
outsourcing may cause loss of knowledge and vendor lock-in. 
Deventer & Singh [26] mentioned two schemes which vendors 
can use to effect this: ‘hard assets’ and ‘soft assets’. Use of 
proprietary hardware and software is classified as a hard asset, 
whereas relationship building to heighten switching costs is 
classified as a soft asset. The results of this study also support 
this classification. In the Novopay project, the incumbent vendor 
developed personal relationships with end-users, so that end-
users were excessively reliant upon them to carry out operations. 
The system was also owned and operated by the vendor. 
However, a prolonged vendor lock-in situation may compel a 
client to carry out a transition, due to loss of knowledge and the 
desire to regain control. The findings of this study suggest that 
transition can be initiated by a client, vendor or due to limitations 
of the incumbent system. In certain situations, it becomes 
inevitable to carry-out a transition. Over a period of time, 
vendors may start migrating clients to a new version of their 
applications to manage support more easily. Legacy systems can 
also become unsupportable due to ICT advancements and 
changes in underlying technologies. Moreover, in public sector 
projects, changes in legislation can create pressures for further 
customizations which can be risky to implement in legacy 
systems. So, at times, avoiding transition could itself be risky 
and infeasible.  
From the results of this study, it was found that there are two 
main reasons for an incumbent system to become obsolete. 
Underlying obsolete technologies, e.g., in this case the payroll 
system was written in an older version of COBOL, finding 
experts for which could become difficult. Secondly, third party 
companies may stop support of their older versions of Operating 
Systems (OS) and Database Management Systems (DBMS) 
making it difficult for vendors to keep providing support 
indefinitely. These aspects should be considered and factored in 
while negotiating contracts. Vendors can develop partnerships 
with third party vendors to implement simpler tools and 
processes for shifting customers to their new platforms or 
versions with ease. If a COTS based system is heavily 
customized for a specific client, then vendors may find it 
difficult to shift it to their new version. Therefore, it is 
imperative to keep track of the customized version to ensure that 
a smooth process is developed. Results of this study shows that 
if knowledge about customizations is not properly documented 
and kept up to date then it may cause over-reliance on specific 
human resources. Due to this reason an incoming vendor can be 
excessively reliant upon the outgoing vendor’s support for 
transition. According to Mirani [27], an outsourcing relationship 
is not fixed, rather it is variable and changes with time. It was 
elaborated that clients often initiate their outsourcing 
relationship by using simpler and straight forward tasks. After 
establishing an initial contract and following the course of time, 
clients begin to assign complex applications to selected vendors 
which necessitates establishing a more loose, trust and network 
based relationship. After following this latter approach, over a 
period of time, applications become business critical. Clients 
may then establish a command-based hierarchy to gain more 
control over their critical operations. The latter necessitates 
either acquiring some form of formal stake or setting up some 
form of subsidiary of its own [27]. The results of this study have 
similarities and contrasts with the Mirani [27] framework as 
shown in Figure 4. To begin with, the client-MoE already had a 
business critical application outsourced to an external vendor. In 
order to regain control from the vendor it was decided that 
Transition1 should be carried out, in which the client will 
insource the management of the implementation (of a new 
system). Changing the sourcing strategy requires changing the 
client’s roles. Yakhlef & Sié [28] described the process of 
moving from insourcing to outsourcing as one of producer to 
purchaser of services and the type of knowledge which a client 
requires to sustain this change. In contrast, the Novopay 
Transition1 followed the process of changing from purchaser to 
provider of services – outsourcing to insourcing. Insourcing 
requires reintegration of knowledge, developing new 
capabilities and competencies [29]. Building such capabilities 
internally for a public sector agency may not be a straight 
forward endeavor. It may also not align with their strategic 
goals.  
 
Figure 4. Comparison between Mirani’s Evolutionary Model and Continuous 
Transition in Novopay  
In the Queensland Health payroll project, when deciding 
about the implementation approach, a similar comparison was 
made between setting up an internal entity (insourcing) and 
choosing an external vendor (outsourcing). According to 
Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry 
Report there were contrary views about this strategic choice. Mr. 
Goddard (Project Management Consultant) and Mr. Uhlmann 
(Expert in IT Projects Delivery) were of the view that an external 
vendor may not lower the cost of the overall project but certainly 
increase the risk of government losing control of its own 
program. Mr. Uhlmann’s statement as recorded in the 
Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry 
Report is worth noting here: “You could have brought someone 
in to ... to bring all the project disciplines into play, get all the 
right people with the right sort of expertise supporting around 
the PMO ... get that applied to your current partners and then 
drive that and hold them accountable ... . If ... the prime 
contractor’s role is ... to replace all of that ... I would not have 
support (sic) that ... [because] ... it’s about who can best 
accelerate the packages of work ... and ... whoever has got the 
background knowledge and the skills and expertise on the 
ground, you want to leverage that ... you would not get rid of 
that sort of knowledge and background expertise ...” 
{Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry 
Report, 2013, pp. 85}. These views of Mr. Goddard and Mr. 
Uhlmann from the QH payroll project coincide with the actions 
and justifications for the decision taken in transition 1 of 
Novopay. It was argued that payroll is business critical and the 
client had lost knowledge and control of it – but MoE didn’t have 
a choice to create a command-based hierarchy (by taking 
ownership of the existing supplier) and therefore, opted for an 
insourcing approach. However, an insourcing approach requires 
building up internal capabilities. External vendors benefit when 
services are outsourced to them and they may make diligent 
efforts to transfer knowledge. In insourcing, vendors may not 
have the same level of enthusiasm and motivation to help 
manage the transfer of knowledge back to the client. Lack of 
preparedness and lack of internal capabilities to manage 
insourcing may trigger another sourcing cycle - Transition2 in 
the case of Novopay. After approximately two years, following 
Transition1 (an insourcing strategy), the client determined they 
lacked the capabilities to manage payroll operations internally. 
It was then decided to re-model the approach and follow a 
complete business process outsourcing, which would help share 
risks and reduce cost for overall operations. Thus, Transition2 
was initiated. Outsourcing ostensibly enables client 
organizations to share risks with vendors. However, the level of 
service that end users expect may not be provided through a new 
vendor. Clients are thus required to build the confidence and 
capacities of end-users and provide support and leverage in 
getting them settled with a new vendor. External vendors may 
have limited interest in building up end-user capabilities, if it is 
not previously arranged.  In the Novopay project, end-users 
faced major issues with service quality after the Transition2 was 
completed. The client MoE had to eventually create an internal 
entity to manage the service delivery and insource the 
operational activities in Transition3. Comparison between 
Mirani’s evolutionary model and the continuous transition 
phenomenon evident in Novopay is shown in Figure 4.  Moving 
from a network based relationship to a contract based 
relationship in Transition1 with known roles may have been 
viable, but the more ambitious outsourcing in Transition2 
probably needed a network based relationship, given the 
inability to fully contractually specify the services to be 
delivered.  In Transition 3 the MoE established an internal entity 
which was effectively a command based hierarchy in order to 
regain control. 
VII. LIMITATIONS 
The results of this paper are based on a single case study. 
However, the case study is analysed longitudinally (over a 10-
year duration) and revealing which justify using a single case 
study. Due to the controversial nature of the transition 
phenomenon there can be difficulties in accessing relevant data. 
This makes Novopay a revealing case. Moreover, the data 
which has been used in this research relates to different time 
frames which provided an opportunity to segment and analyze 
data at multiple times making the analysis longitudinal and 
unique.  
Another limitation concerns the nature of the data used in this 
study. Novopay data was provided by the Ministry of 
Education, New Zealand, due to the Official Information Act 
1982. The data dump was not collected for the purpose of 
carrying out research and the researchers had limited control 
over it. However, this limitation increased the objectivity of the 
data and reduced the researchers’ bias in data collection. On the 
downside, it took more time to establish connections between 
concepts within the voluminous data. Data dumps like Novopay 
provide another avenue and possibly untapped data sources for 
software engineering researchers to explore. As the analysis 
was conducted as part of a doctoral study, the coding was 
largely conducted by a single rater, apart from a pilot study 
conducted in collaboration between the three authors. However 
findings were regularly cross-checked with the supervisors of 
the study, for plausibility and comprehensiveness.  The use of a 
clearly defined protocol for the thematic analysis further helped 
build rigor into the study. The results of this research are more 
generalizable to a public-private partnership (PPP) context as 
can be noticed from the similarities with the Queensland Health 
(QH) Payroll project. However, a fuller analysis of the QH 
payroll project is still to be carried out. This is being considered 
as a future development in this research. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents narratives revolving around continuous 
transition of the Novopay case study. It involved changing 
payroll system, service delivery model and refining business 
processes. It also included switching from an onshore to a near-
shore vendor. The Novopay project, unlike originally planned, 
went through three distinct transitions. 
• Transition1 followed an insourcing approach to address 
loss of knowledge and control of client-MoE over the 
payroll operations. However, with more control comes 
more responsibilities and risks, which the client-MoE was 
not prepared to manage. Insourcing was also not 
considered in-line with core competencies of client-MoE. 
The above paved the way for another transition.  
• In Transition2, loss of control and knowledge through 
external vendor, the premises on which Transition1 was 
initiated, was overruled for sharing risks with an external 
vendor. Thus the project was completely outsourced 
again. However the effect on end-users of vendor 
nonperformance was not carefully considered. 
• The third transition, Transition3 was initiated due to end-
users’ dissatisfaction about following new business 
processes and concerns about working with a new vendor. 
The new business processes did not effectively service 
end-users. The client then established an internal entity to 
decentralize operational services to help support end-
users in Transition3. 
This shows that the process of Transition can carry forward 
and propagate to another cycle if clients do not choose the right 
sourcing model or strategy at the relevant point in time. 
Understanding internal capabilities and acknowledging the 
varying capabilities of vendors and end-users are imperative in 
this regard. Clients should develop multivariate strategies to 
manage incumbent vendors whilst supporting end-users and 
keeping track of the obsolescence of incumbent-systems to 
become transition-ready. It must be noted that a network-based 
type of relationship cannot be established instantaneously. 
Rather, they are developed progressively. Therefore, public 
sector clients should be conscious of the relationship between 
end-users and vendors. 
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